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History of Electricity Provision 
• At some point in the history of a state the 
provision of electricity is part of a ‘social 
compact’: providing broad public access; 
providing supply to stimulate economic growth 
• Industrialised countries in late 80s/early 90s 
began to change – economic efficiency 
paradigm opened up by small scale technology, 
with electronic control systems & communication 
– competition through decentralisation 
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Developing countries 
• The social contract wasn’t being delivered 
• Financial management was poor 
• Not everyone was connected 
• Those who were connected are not connected 
24/7 
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The solution: the market model  
• Change in management practices (sometimes 
ownership) 
• Restructure for competition (‘dergulation’ & 
‘unbundling’) 
• Many countries are not enthusiastic about 
privitisation but there are models combining 
state ownership & competition eg Norway which 
is still state-owned but different state entities eg 
municipalities are able to generate electricity. 
26 January 2011 5 
 Advantages  & Disadvantages 
• Competition provides incentives for cost savings & 
productivity enhancement 
• Consumers will use energy more wisely – paying full cost 
BUT 
• Capital costs more because there’s a higher risk (not backed 
by the tax payer) 
• Planning is difficult with multiple players and their 
commerical confidentiality; getting the least cost option 
mix 
• Competition can be expensive to coordinate eg experience 
of the UK (other promises have also not been maintained – 
cheap electricity). 
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Does one size fit all?  
• Small countries – might be difficult to apply – 
might not get economies of scale (cf Norway 
& Jordan) 
• Inward investment needs transparent & 
regulated financial sector 
• Private sector is not interested in the ‘social 
contract’ 
• Unregulated private sector isn’t perfect eg 
Enron 
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What has driven the model in 
developing countries? 
• Late 1980s money for large infrastructure 
projects became more difficult to find 
• World Bank (Washington Consensus) used this 
to push the model – conditionality – loan only 
on the basis of opening up the market 
• Politics of 1980s/90s dominated by a 
paradigm of rolling back the state & allowing 
markets to provide goods & services  
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What happened? 
• 1990s moves to privatise state utilities 
• Poor state of sector made it difficult to sell – no 
profit & high risk 
• IPPPs entered the sector as generators – very 
favourable terms (high prices; take-or-pay 
contracts; government guarantees for non-
payment) or managers of the state utility 
• Complaints – who was benefitting? Corruption! 
Skewing incentives to new generation & not 
necessarily renewables – energy efficiency was 
neglected. 
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Social & environmental equity 
• Will not be delivered by the market voluntarily 
(despite CSR – electricity utilities have a bad 
reputation for this – energy efficiency 
programmes have been a casualty) 
• Rural electrification in the USA was delivered 
through cooperatives 
• There is still a role for the state 
• There is still a need to fulfil the social contract 
• There is a need to reduce the environmental 
footprint of electricity production 
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Hybrid models? 
• Allowing third parties (private or community 
actors) to invest in generation 
• Only based on renewables? 
• Promoting end-use efficiency – win-win 
situation  
• Both of these options qualify for CDM 
financing 
• Needs fiscal capacity, administrative capacity 
(policies & enforcement of regulations) 
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The role of informal actors 
• Budget & legal limitations 
• Limited capacity 
[Seems to have been a general experience for 
most institutions in privitisation] 
• Requires new institutional forms – governance 
structures 
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Jordan 
• Went down the electricity privatisation route end 
of 1990s – unbundled generation, transmission & 
distribution 
• Seems to have been a lack of tenders – process 
was taking place against the financial crisis – 
companies expected high returns & low risks 
• Prices had gone up – low-income households 
were having problems and the utilities were 
facing reducing in income 
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Jordan – the role of municipalities 
• Local Government was reorganised in 2001 – play a 
role in service delivery (decentralisation) – would 
appear to allow for electricity generation 
• Capacity has been built by World Bank projects 
• Budgets are constrained – so not entering into 
generation 
• They are not regarded as natural partners by agencies 
financing energy projects 
• But municipalities also pay energy bills (eg street 
lighting) – and they have become very expensive 
• So pilot schemes with EEL & solar are underway 
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Governance issues in a commercial 
electricity sector 
• Many countries have struggled with utility reform 
• Tariff rises haven’ t matched service improvement 
• Revenue sharing seems to have helped get poor 
consumers a fair deal.  
Profits benchmark & tariffs are  set – if efficiency 
gains raise profits above benchmark tariffs are 
lowered. 
• Regulators have struggled to keep control of the 
regulated – often when accounting & auditing 
standards are weak 
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Governance 
• Governance is used synonymously with 
tackling corruption – but it is more than this 
• Corruption of newspaper headlines (grand 
corruption) – kickbacks for contracts 
• Petty corruption: illegal connections (paid & 
unpaid), payments to meter readers – at 
aggregate level more than grand 
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Governance 
• Governance is about getting the system working that 
meets the social contract, is financially sound & has 
environmental benefits 
• 3 factors identified as undermining sound utility 
financing: poor bill collection rates; excessive costs 
(inefficient operation & petty corruption); tariffs below 
cost recovery rates 
• Generally privatisation has addressed these factors 
satisfactorily 
• Other benefits require regulatory regime that delivers 
transparency, is accountable & promotes participation  
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Public participation: 
 a dimension of good governance 
• Informing the public 
Their rights. How to make a complaint 
Why prices rise 
• Involving the public 
Throws up surprises – customers want to pay on 
basis of good billing; end to illegal taping – 
customers provide solutions  
• Serving the public 
Public as clients – training staff in customer 
relations 
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Public participation 
• Not everyone wants to be involved 
• Can be through civil society organisations eg 
Electricity Users Associations; cooperatives 
(Bangladesh) 
• These also have to be transparent organisations – 
who do they represent? 
• Well functioning CSOs can help with transparency 
issues 
• Their capacity needs building – tools exist eg 
Electricity Governance Toolkit 
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Concluding remarks 
• Focus has been on areas of governance which get 
less attention 
• Ensuring the social contract in electricity delivery 
doesn’t have to mean complete privatisation 
• Privatisation in small states (particularly in 
developing countries) hasn’t been successful 
• There are models that allow for third party 
participation in electricity delivery – technical and 
‘regulatory’ side 
26 January 2011 20 
